Bitcoin Core developer Cory Fields has outlined three experimental mechanisms that could make future quantum-enabled Bitcoin theft financially costly for attackers. The concepts, called Quantum Landmines, Staked Auction and Sats Auction, use collateral, hidden ownership proofs and competitive bidding to discourage attempts to take control of vulnerable BTC.
Fields shared the ideas in a November 4 post to the Bitcoin development mailing list. He described them as thought experiments rather than finalized proposals, leaving the technical implementation and specific network rules for future discussion. The framework assumes Bitcoin would first introduce a quantum-safe output type and later activate rules governing how legacy coins could be spent.
The underlying concern is that sufficiently powerful quantum computers could eventually derive private keys from exposed public keys, potentially putting some older Bitcoin holdings at risk. No quantum computer currently has the demonstrated capability to break Bitcoin’s cryptography, but developers are examining how the network could respond before such a threat becomes practical.
How Quantum Landmines Could Make Bitcoin Theft Costly
The first mechanism, Quantum Landmines, would allow Bitcoin owners to prepare hidden proofs of ownership before quantum attacks become feasible. If someone later attempts to spend their vulnerable coins, the transaction would require an equivalent amount of BTC as collateral from a quantum-safe output. The funds would then be subject to a waiting period, giving the original owner time to respond.
In Fields’ example, an owner holding 1 BTC in a vulnerable legacy output would also commit a small quantum-safe output containing a hidden proof that they knew the original private key before the quantum threat emerged. If an attacker attempted to move the 1 BTC, they would need to provide another 1 BTC as collateral, with both amounts placed under proposed spending restrictions.
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During a suggested 30-day waiting period, the legitimate owner could reveal the previously committed proof and direct the funds to a quantum-safe public key. A successful claim would allow the owner to recover the original BTC and take the attacker’s collateral. The attacker would therefore risk losing their own Bitcoin without successfully stealing the targeted coins.
The mechanism depends on owners preparing these proofs in advance and retaining the ability to respond. It would not automatically protect coins whose owners have lost their keys or never established a landmine. That limitation is important because some older Bitcoin holdings are believed to be inaccessible, including coins widely attributed to Bitcoin’s pseudonymous creator, Satoshi Nakamoto.
Staked Auction and Sats Auction Target Dormant Bitcoin
Fields’ second concept, Staked Auction, addresses vulnerable holdings that may not have an active owner capable of revealing an ownership proof. It would allow third parties to commit BTC to hidden bids before quantum attacks become possible. These commitments would target specific vulnerable outputs and establish competing claims to an attacker’s collateral if those coins were later spent.
Under the proposed design, an attacker attempting to move 50 BTC would also need to provide matching collateral. Once the initial ownership-proof period expired, participants could reveal their previously committed bids and compete for portions of that collateral. The original vulnerable BTC would be burned rather than returned to its original owner, meaning the mechanism would not necessarily restore the stolen coins.
The third concept, Sats Auction, would remove the requirement for participants to stake funds before a quantum attack. Instead, spending vulnerable legacy BTC would trigger an auction after the initial waiting period. Participants could bid against one another, with the highest bidder receiving the targeted coins minus their bid, while the second-highest bidder would lose their bid without receiving anything.
This structure draws on the Dollar Auction game, in which competing participants can become financially committed to winning even when continued bidding becomes increasingly costly. A quantum attacker could face pressure to keep bidding to avoid becoming the losing participant. In theory, this could make an attempted theft economically unattractive, although the outcome would depend on the auction rules and the willingness of others to participate.
The proposals also introduce difficult trade-offs for legitimate Bitcoin holders. If the network required collateral for all spending of vulnerable legacy outputs after a defined quantum-security transition, owners moving their own coins could face the same requirements as attackers. Holders without additional quantum-safe BTC might struggle to migrate their funds, while auction participants would need to accept the possibility of losing their committed capital.
Fields acknowledged that the designs leave many questions unresolved, including collateral ratios, auction timing, losing-bid penalties and how unused funds should be distributed. He also raised a broader question about the desired outcome: whether Bitcoin should prioritize preventing theft, encouraging participation in protective auctions or redistributing vulnerable coins.
For now, Quantum Landmines, Staked Auction and Sats Auction remain conceptual approaches rather than approved Bitcoin upgrades. Their significance lies in expanding the discussion beyond cryptographic migration to the economic incentives that could shape behavior if quantum attacks ever become viable. Any implementation would require further technical work and community discussion before becoming part of Bitcoin’s consensus rules.
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